Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 3

Article 3

4-15-2002

Two Kinds of Statistics, the Kind You Look Up and the Kind You
Make Up: A Critical Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics
and the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Jennifer Wolfberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer Wolfberg Two Kinds of Statistics, the Kind You Look Up and the Kind You Make Up: A Critical
Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 29 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 3
(2002)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Two Kinds of Statistics, the Kind
You Look Up and the Kind You
Make Up:' A Critical Analysis of
Comparative Provider Statistics and
the Doctrine of Informed Consent

I.

INTRODUCTION

Internet technology affords unprecedented accessibility to information
previously too difficult or impossible to obtain.2 This "technological
tsunami" has washed over the medical field by allowing both private and
public agencies to compile and manage comparative provider statistics
This comment introduces the question of whether the enhancement of
technology indeed benefits a patient in providing his/her true informed
consent.' At least one court has already held that access to these
comparative provider statistics can be material in making up a patient's mind
regarding going forward with a particular procedure or using a particular
provider. For example, in 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found a
doctor liable under the state's informed consent laws because he failed to
inform a patient about a competing physician's practice nearby.' Although
there has not as yet been a stampede through the courts, it is just a matter of
time before the rest of the country eventually follows suit with Wisconsin
and broadens the doctrine of informed consent to include provisions of
provider statistics.'
1. Rex Stout, American Writer (1886-1975).
2. See generally Jean Hellwege, Law of Informed Consent Poisedfor Revolution, Experts Say,
36 TRIAL 128 (July 2000).
3. Id. at 128.
4. Id.
5. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
6. Id. at 510 (discussing when the duty of sharing statistics is material to a patient's decision,
the next step would be for a doctor to refer the patient elsewhere).
7. Hellwege, supra note 2, at 129.

Section II of this comment provides a comprehensive historical
background on the creation, growth, and purpose of informed consent.8
Focusing on the principles supporting this doctrine, this section begins
looking at the 1957 decision of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University
Board of Trustees,9 and quickly moves through the following decades,
specifically analyzing the first patient-based standard of informed consent
decided in 1972.0

Part III undertakes a detailed analysis of the comparative provider
statistics that may shape the future of medical practitioners' disclosure
requirements under the law of informed consent." These statistics and their
assumed value will likely be used to further future legislative acts'2 and
judicial decisions.'3 This section explores the multitude of variables that can
make these statistics unwieldy and unreliable, as well as to what extent a
medical provider would be expected to know, rely on, and inform patients
based on these statistics.' Finally, this section attempts to determine when
statistics become more burdensome than helpful to the patient, despite the
goal of obtaining comprehensive and informed decision-making on the part
of the patient. 5
Part IV contemplates the effects of enforcing the use of comparative
provider statistics in informed consent cases.'6 There are potentially grave
consequences for surrounding legal issues in the medical field.'7 If the
ultimate purpose of the doctrine is to give patients accurate information that
is useful in aiding informed decision-making about his/her health care,
comparative provider statistics must prove to be accurate, comprehensible
and trustworthy before mandating their use in informed consent.' 8 The
analysis suggests that medical statistics will not support the spirit of
informed consent.'9

Finally, Part V sets forth a proposal for obtaining a healthy balance
between doctor and patient autonomy, and concludes this comment."

8. See infra notes 21-112 and accompanying text.
9. 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
10. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rejecting the "professional"
standard and opting for a patient-based standard for measuring the physician's disclosure duty).
11. See infra notes 113-144 and accompanying text.
12. Massachusetts has already enacted the Public Access Data statute regulating public access to
data regarding physicians. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11l,
§ 53B; ch. I 18G, § 6; ch. 221, § 26
(West 1997) (recognizing the enactment by 1996 legislative session as ch. 307, "Physicians - Public
Access to Data Concerning Physicians").
13. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-144 and accompanying text.
15.

See id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 145-193 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INFORMED CONSENT

Obtaining a patient's consent before undertaking a medical procedure
This historical duty of
has been required for more than 200 years.'
obtaining a patient's consent "bears only a minimal similarity" to presentday "informed consent."2
Prior to the doctrine of informed consent,
physicians avoided actions of battery23 by proving their patients were
advised of the upcoming medical treatment. 4 Until recently, patients were
not seen as being able to make autonomous decisions, able to be partners
with their physicians in medical decision-making, but were still able to sue
doctors if they did not receive disclosures and were treated without having
given their permission. Currently, the doctrine of informed consent affords
a client two causes of action: one against a care giver for treating without
any consent,26 and a second for failing to disclose enough information to be
considered true informed consent. 7 Once a physician is found to have

breached his/her duty to disclose, he/she will be liable for any damages
which resulted from treatment. 8

21. See Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767) ("[Ilt is reasonable that a patient
should be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put himself in such a
situation as to enable him to undergo the operation.").
22. Honorable Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From the Ambivalence of Arato to the
Thunder of Thor, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 261, 262 (1994).
23. If a patient is physically and mentally able to consent to a procedure, in the absence of an
emergency, consent is a "prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician, and an operation
without the patient's consent is a technical assault." Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Pa.
1992) (quoting Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932); see also Ford v. Ford, 10
N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1887) ("[T]he absence of lawful consent is part of the definition of an
assault.") (citing Christopher v. Bare, 116 Eng. Rep. 554, 556 (Q.B. 1848)).
24. Id.
25. Jay Katz, M.D., Informed Consent - Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 69, 73 (1993). Patients had to wait until the late 1950's before the idea that doctors
were the only competent individuals to make medical decisions, and thus were the only ones to have
the authority and power over those decisions, was abolished. Id.
26. Including an action for battery when a surgeon, other than the one the patient approved,
performs a consented-to operation. Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, Hosp. Risk Control, ECRI
(Plymouth Meeting, Pa.) (Nov. 1993).
27. Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 557, 561-62 (2000). The most common cause of action arises out of-a physician's
failure to disclose. See id. In order to plead a claim for failure to disclose, "a patient must allege
that: (1)the physician had a duty to disclose the particular information; (2) the physician breached
this duty; and (3) the physician's breach caused an injury to the patient." Id. at 562.
28. Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1992).
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A.

The Case History

The term "informed consent" was born in 1957 in the California
Appellate Court,29 resulting in today's comprehensive disclosures of risks,
benefits and available treatment," including non-treatment.3' In Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, plaintiff sought treatment

for pain he experienced in his hips and lower back.3" After an initial
examination, the physician expected that plaintiff might have had an aortal
clot that was impairing the blood supply to plaintiffs legs.33 The doctor
proceeded to advise plaintiff regarding the seriousness of his condition and
told him he should proceed immediately to the hospital for evaluation."
Plaintiff was told that in order to discover the exact location and size of the
blockage, he would be put under local anesthetic and a needle would be used
to inject material into the aorta, and then x-rays would be taken.3 Plaintiff
was told that this procedure would help the doctor determine whether an
operation would be necessary in order to prolong his life. 6 Upon his
doctor's advisement, plaintiff went to the hospital for the procedure.37 After
the procedure, plaintiff recovered from the anesthesia but awoke the next
morning permanently paralyzed from the waist down.38 In a landmark
decision, the doctor was held liable for lack of obtaining informed consent.39
The court held, "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.""0

29. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957). While the term "informed consent" was first uttered in 1957, the idea that a patient has a
fundamental right to make his or her medical decision was clearly invoked in 1914. Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In an earlier case, the unauthorized act of
removing a woman's ovaries and uterus was recognized as a trespass and a battery, which was the
theory relied on prior to the concept of informed consent. Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (II1. 1906).
30. Arabian, supra note 22, at 263.
31. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). California requires "reasonable disclosure
of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy including nontreatment and the dangers
inherently and potentially involved in each." Id. at 383. When a patient refuses treatment they must
be apprized of the risks of not undergoing treatment. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906-07
(Cal. 1980).
32. Salgo, 317P.2dat 173.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 174-75.
39. Id. at 181.
40. Id. The court also made it clear that a physician may not discount or minimize the risks
involved in order to obtain informed consent from a patient, and the physician must inform the
patient of every risk, no matter how remote. Id.
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Three years later, Kansas followed California and attempted to add
clarifications to the new law." In Natanson v. Kline, plaintiff, a breast
cancer patient, sought treatment from a radiologist after her mastectomy.42
After radiation treatment, plaintiffs "entire chest, skin, cartilage and bone
were completely destroyed" in the treated areas.43 Adding to the Salgo
decision, the court stated that in order to obtain informed consent
successfully, a physician is "to disclose and explain to the patient, in
language as simple as necessary, the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives," and
perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the
body. 45
B.

Changes in Perspective

While one approach to informed consent is to require that a physician be
responsible for disclosing information that a reasonable medical provider
would disclose, 6 the national trend is to define requirements based on the
patient's point of view.47 Often the doctor and patient disagree, but while the
41. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
42. Id. at 1095.
43. Id. at 1097.
44. Although it is common for jurisdictions to require a physician to disclose treatment
alternatives, some even require disclosure of alternatives that are more hazardous than the treatment
he/she is recommending. See e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n., 465 A.2d 294, 301-02 (Conn.
1983). But see Pratt v. Univ. of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. & Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn.
1987) (having no duty to disclose risks associated with diagnoses other than the one which the
physician is, in fact, making).
45. Id. at 1106.
46. Gatter, supra note 27, at 566. Although the "Prudent Physician Standard" calls for a
physician to disclose information that the average reasonable physician would disclose in the same
position, it still accommodates the subjective patient characteristics. Id. After speaking to a patient
and hearing his/her subjective concerns, the physician must then decide what to disclose based on
the information gathered from the patient. Id; see also infra notes 44-76 and accompanying text.
47. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993). For a national trend of cases interpreting
informed consent from the perspective of the reasonable patient, see Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d
1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993) (noting that the doctrine of informed consent in Pennsylvania requires
disclosures of the facts, risks, complications, and alternatives to surgery that a reasonable person in
the patient's position would have considered significant); Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 136 n.6
(Utah 1989) (stating information a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would deem
important); Pedersen v. Vahidy, 552 A.2d 419, 425 (Conn. 1989) (using a lay standard of disclosure
that obligates the physician to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient
would have found material) (citing Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983));
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 412 (La. 1989) (acknowledging that a risk is material
when a person in what the doctor knows or should know to be the patient's position would be likely
to attach significance to the risk); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359
(Iowa 1987) (noting that the physician's duty to disclose is measured by the patient's need to receive
material information); Precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Mass. 1985) (recognizing that

doctor may be looking out for his/her patient's best interest, "'[a] doctor's
altruism notwithstanding, his agenda and value system are not the same as
those of the patient."' 8 Thus, in many jurisdictions, it is for the patient to
decide what is and what is not "material" when making his/her decision. 9
In 1972, Canterbury v. Spence was the first case to adopt an objective
standard." Canterbury involved a case where a man became paralyzed after
a laminectomy." In this landmark decision, the court clearly stated that the
information required to be divulged was "all risks potentially affecting the

[patient's] decision."52 The objective standard that was adopted was the
"prudent person in the patient's position," effectively denying patients the
ability to act on "irrational" preferences.53 This perspective of what the
average patient would want to know is "dictated by the needs and feelings of
individual patients.

54

material information is that which the physician knows or should know a person in the plaintiff's
position would consider important) (citing Hamish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240,
243 (Mass 1982)); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985) (adopting a
reasonableness standard based on the patient and rejecting the "professional" theory and noting that
an increasing number of courts have rejected the "professional rule"); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014,
1021-22 (Md. 1977) (joining an "ever-expanding number of courts" that have rejected the
professional standard of care and adopting a standard measuring the physician's duty to disclosure
by what is material to the patient); Small v. Gifford Mem'l Hosp., 349 A.2d 703, 707 (Vt. 1975)
(describing that physician's duty is to furnish information material to intelligent choice by a
reasonable person situated as was the patient). Possibly the first in this line of cases is the influential
decision of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rejecting the
"professional" standard and opting for a patient-based standard for measuring the physician's
disclosure duty). But see Smith v. Weaver, 407 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Neb. 1987) (noting that Nebraska
has been committed by its legislature to the "professional" theory under which disclosure is based on
what an ordinary health care provider in the same or similar locality would disclose) (citing NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1984); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ark. 1980) (rejecting the
patient-based view and adopting the "professional" theory).
48. See Katz, supra note 25, at 75 (quoting a 1993 interview with surgeon Sherwin Nuland).
49. Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243-44 (Mass. 1982). The court
defined materiality as "the significance a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should
know is his patient's position, would attach to the disclosed risk or risks in deciding whether to
submit or not to submit to surgery or treatment." Id. at 243 (quoting Wilkenson v. Vessey, 295 A.2d
676, 689 (R.I. 1972)). A few years later, in an attempt to clarify the meaning of materiality, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court described materiality as "the product of the risk and its chance of
occurring. A severe consequence, ordinarily of interest to the patient, would not require disclosure if
the chance of the consequence occurring was so remote as to be negligible." Precourt v. Frederick,
481 N.E.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Mass. 1985) (quoting LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So.2d 1039, 1046 (La.
1983)).
50. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court rejected the physician-based standard because it is
"at odds with the patient's prerogative to decide on projected therapy." Id. at 786.
51. Id. at 777. A laminectomy is a surgical procedure that reduces the pressure and irritation on
the nerve roots in the lower back which are caused by the degeneration of ligaments. Cleveland
Clinic
Foundation
Anesthesiology
Education
Center,
available
at
http://www.anes.ccf.org:8080/pilot/ortho/lumbarla.htm.
52. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
53. Id. at 791. To determine what a reasonable person in the patient's shoes would want to
know, the court looks to a jury. Id. at 788.
54. Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor
and Physician-SpecificDisclosure, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (1997).
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1. How Well a Doctor Must Know His/Her Patient
In the many jurisdictions that approach true informed consent from the
perspective of the patient, the burden of determining the position of the
There is a
patient is placed on the shoulders of the physician."
presupposition that in order to determine the point of view of his/her patient,
a physician would conduct an adequate inquiry with each patient.56 Included

in this presupposition is a belief that in order to competently and properly
obtain the views of the patient, the physician must take into consideration
subjective points of view which would include medical as well as nonmedical characteristics.57 After talking to the patient and determining what

the treatment options are, it would be the provider's responsibility to transfer
the subjective information onto a faceless objective reasonable patient. 8
Despite the fact that both the reasonable patient and reasonable

physician standards require doctors to take into consideration the subjective
characteristics of their patients, there still is no exact definition of the
physician's duty.59 Interpretation of the extent to which a physician must

know his or her patient before he or she can disclose treatment advice varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' In some jurisdictions, despite how easy it
would be for a physician to spend minimal time interviewing their patient to
avoid a false diagnosis, it is simply not required for informed consent.6' For
instance, in Bush v. Stack, 2 a patient sought treatment from his physician
regarding the pain his wife was having during sexual intercourse."7 After
talking with his patient, the physician determined that the patient's spouse
was experiencing discomfort due to the curvature of the patient's penis and

55. See Gatter, supra note 27, at 564.
56. Id. There is a presupposition that the reasonable standard demands that the doctor first assess
a patient's circumstances before recommending a course of treatment. Id. Not until the doctor
assesses the patient's position can he/she determine what course of treatment would be applicable to
a reasonable patient in this patient's position. Id.
57. Id. Subjective characteristics that belong to a patient, and should be taken into consideration,
include religious beliefs, background, idiosyncrasies, as well as circumstances surrounding the
medical reasons that the patient seeks treatment. Id.
58. Id. This average reasonable patient approach suggests that the standard is neither subjective,
nor objective, but a combination of the two. Id. Both the reasonable patient and the reasonable
physician standard take on this hybrid approach to what should be disclosed. Id. at 566; see also
supra notes 21-54 and accompanying text.
59. Gatter, supra note 27, at 567.
60. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
61. Bush v. Stack, 95 Wash. App. 1073 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), petition for review denied, 139
Wash. 2d 1019 (2000).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1084.

accordingly recommended a surgical procedure to reduce the curvature. '
The source of pain, however, was the wife's episiotomy scar." The court
held that unless the patient told the physician that his wife's scar was the
source of the pain, the physician did not have a duty to disclose to the patient
that the recommended procedure was unlikely to cure or reduce the pain
caused by the scar.' While the cause of the wife's pain could have easily
been determined through a series of simple follow-up questions, the court
held that a patient has a responsibility to communicate certain pertinent facts
to his/her doctor.67
2.

How Well a Patient Can Know His/Her Physician

Most courts have refused to include a doctor's experience as a material
fact that needs to be disclosed to a patient in medical decision-making.68
However, when patients specifically seek information from their physician
regarding their educational background and experience, the doctor has a duty
to answer questions truthfully and recognize that this particular patient

deems the information material in making his/her decision. 69
3. Only Disclosure of Medical Circumstances Necessary
Courts generally require "physicians to discover and account for only
patient's medical circumstances as physicians determine what treatment
information to disclose to patients."7 What should be disclosed to the
patient from the patient's position, that is what the patient would find
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1085.
66. Id. at 1091. Once the physician identifies the medical condition, it is not necessary for
him/her to attempt to discover any additional information from the patient. Id.
67. Id.
68. See e.g., Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting "expansive
approach" to informed-consent law and holding that the surgeon's lack of experience in performing
surgical procedure is not a "material fact" triggering disclosure requirement); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947
P.2d 952 (Haw. 1997) (holding no duty to disclose physician's lack of experience or incompetence);
Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1990) (holding no duty to disclose physicians lack of
experience); Abram v. Children's Hosp. of Buffalo, 151 A.D.2d 972 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding
no duty to disclose medical personnel's qualifications or lack thereof); Wachter v. United States, 689
F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1988) (holding no duty to disclose experience of physician under federal or
state law). See also Helmbrecht v. Dental Implant Ctr. of Orange County, unpublished (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that an assisting doctor, specialist or consultant has no duty to "inform a patient
as to the graduation date, number of years of practice, or experience level of her treating physician").
69. Tracy Blitz Newman, If Patient Asks, Doctor's Experience Becomes Relevant to Informed
Consent, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, October, 1999. "A surgeon who, when answering a patient's
inquiries, misinforms the patient about this information and misleads the patient into believing that
the hands of an experienced surgeon will be performing the operation, does not have the true consent
of that patient." Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), rev'd, 771 A.2d 1255.
70. Gatter, supra note 27, at 570. Most courts only require a physician to inquire into the
patient's medical condition and proposed treatment and not to inquire about the patient's nonmedical characteristics, no matter how relevant or helpful. See id. at 568.
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material or relevant in his/her circumstance, is often determined solely by
the medical condition or treatment options, rather than non-medical

characteristics that can influence a patient's decision.' This trend toward
judicial restraint can be seen clearly in the California Supreme Court
decision of Arato v. Avedon."

In Arato, a decedent's family sued on a

71. For cases determining the patient's point of view based on his/her medical condition, see
Heazeau v. Pendleton Methodist Mem'l Hosp., 715 So. 2d 756, 762 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding
a lower court finding that the risk of infection during knee surgery is a risk about which a reasonable
person in the patient's position would want to know, where the only facts presented about the
plaintiff concerned his medical history and condition); Caputa v. Anitles, 686 A.2d 356, 362 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that "[a] patient with no fever, only partial obstruction of one
kidney, intermittent pain, and who vomited only once without question would desire to be informed
not only of the option of surgery, but also of the much less intrusive alternative .... "); Metzler v.
Dichraff, 570 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished opinion), available at 1997 WL 370036
July 8, 1997) (concluding that an issue of fact exists about whether a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would have considered material information about the availability of specialists
to perform a third molar extraction, when the only factual information reported about the plaintiff
was that she had an impacted third molar). For cases determining the patient's point of view based
on his/her treatment options, see Kain v. United States, No. Civ. A. 93-2466, 1994 WL 71261, at 2-3
(E.D. Pa. March 9, 1994) (finding that the risk of a hernia associated with the surgical removal of the
gallbladder is not material based only upon the evidence concerning the liklihood and seriousness of
the risk for patients undergoing the same surgery); Finnegan v. Yamour, No. 715, 1990 WL 119244,
at 7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1990) (noting that testimony that a patient undergoing the kind of
surgery performed on the plaintiff should be informed of the risks of hemorrhage, infection, and
difficulty in healing was sufficient to support a jury finding that the plaintiff had been informed of
all material risks). For cases that determine the patient's point of view based on someone suffering
from the same medical condition, considering the same courses of treatment, see Wachter v. United
States, 877 F.2d 257, 258-61 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the patient's position included having a
clogged coronary artery despite prior bypass surgery and considering whether to undergo a second
bypass procedure); Ellis v. Smith, 528 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (describing the key
issues as "the reasonable disclosure and informed consent necessary for elective foot surgery on a
muscular dystrophy patient .. "); Rowinsky v. Sperling, 681 A.2d 785, 789-90 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (noting that evidence on the record that plaintiff suffered from grand mal seizures originating
in the left temporal lobe of his brain and that brain surgery to remove the damaged section of the
brain had been recommended was sufficient to support the jury's finding that a reasonable person in
the patients position would have wanted to know the risk that memory or speech abilities could be
lost). For cases that determine the reasonable physician's point of view based on patient's with the
same medical circumstances and treatment alternatives, see Shepard v. United States, No. CV-S-87726-PMP (RJJ), 1989 WL 248215, at 3 (D. Nev. Sept. 19, 1989) (implying that a prudent physician
in the same or similar circumstances is the one advising a patient about the bone graft surgery
performed on the patient); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 913 (Colo. 1982) (defining a prudent
physician rule to require disclosure of risks that are "medically significant to the patient's surgical
decision .... "); Shabinaw v. Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1189-1192 (Idaho 1998) (in overturning trial
court's grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict against a physician, the state supreme court
reviewed the expert testimony concerning standards for disclosure, including testimony describing
the relevant circumstances as treating a patient in whom the physician "suspected a total bowel
obstruction," and decided that there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict); Wecker v.
Amend, 918 P.2d 658, 660, 662 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (determining that the trial court erred when it
failed to instruct the jury that the duty of disclosure includes disclosing the treatment alternatives for
patients with potentially cancerous cervical warts).
72. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).

theory of informed consent because a doctor did not inform the patient of the
mortality rate for his disease on grounds that if the patient had known, he
would have taken care of his financial affairs before he died.73 The court
held that a physician need not "disclose every contingency that might affect
the patient's nonmedical rights and interests."74 However, when a physician
knows about a patient's medical past and specific fears regarding medical
outcomes, court's have held physicians liable for failure to disclose potential
outcomes, however remote.75 For example, after consulting with her doctor,
a female patient decided to proceed with an operation designed to leave her
sterile.76 After becoming pregnant, she sued the physician for failing to
inform her that there was a 0.1 to 0.3 percent chance of still getting pregnant
despite the surgery.77 Notwithstanding the small risk of getting pregnant
after the procedure, the court held in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that the
plaintiffs medical background as well as her fears of the procedure
supported a cause of action against the physician for violating his duty to
disclose." This case is a perfect example of why the logical starting place
for treating a patient is to explore the "patient's subjective characteristics
and circumstances" when determining what information needs to be
disclosed.79
Another obstacle a physician faces when obtaining informed consent is
when a patient refuses treatment." Although as a general proposition, a
doctor has no duty to treat an individual after that individual refuses the care,
the physician does have a duty to provide the patient with "'reasonable
disclosure of the available [alternate] choices ...[for] therapy... and of the
dangers... potentially involved in each."' 8 In Thor v. Superior Court, a
particular case of medical care referral, the California Supreme Court
balanced the integrity of an individual with a state's interest in the wellbeing of an individual, ultimately siding with the patient.82 In Thor, a patient
had become a quadriplegic after a fall and subsequently refused to eat or
receive medical treatment." The court held "that a physician has no duty to

73. See id. at 608.
74. lid. at 609.
75. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F. 2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.1983).
76. See id. at 1547.
77. Gatter, supra note 27, at 575 n. 109. In fact, the doctor informed the patient that the procedure
was one hundred percent effective. Id. The patient further testified, that had she known the
procedure for having herself sterilized was less than one hundred percent effective, her boyfriend
would have proceeded with a vasectomy in order to avoid future pregnancies. Id.
78. Id. at 576. The plaintiff had previously informed her doctor about her "history of
gynecological problems, including an ectopic pregnancy, and ...she had been told by another
physician that she would not survive additional pregnancies." Id.
79. Id.
80. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
81. Id. at 383 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (1972)).
82. Id. at 375.
83. Id. at 379. The right to refuse medical treatment is derived from the right to privacy implied
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treat" a patient who refuses health care after making a "'reasonable
disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy
[including nontreatment] and of the dangers inherently and potentially
involved in each.' 84
4.

Comparing Doctors: a New Disclosure Requirement?

In 1996, a Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a reasonable patient,
before consenting to a surgical procedure, would want to know how his/her
physician ranked compared to other physicians." This is the first case in the
country to suggest that a doctor may have an obligation to disclose his own
level of experience regarding a particular procedure, before obtaining "true"
informed consent. 86 Although the doctor in Johnson v. Kokemoor provided
his patient with misleading information,87 the court did not confine its
opinion to the narrow reading regarding misinformation, but instead
observed that a reasonable patient, in certain undefined circumstances,
would want to know, and should thus be informed, how his/her physician
ranks with other physicians.88 The court stated that "[wihen different
physicians have substantially different success rates, whether surgery is
performed by one rather than another represents a choice between 'alternate,
viable medical modes of treatment,"' and requires disclosure under

in the penumbra of the United States Constitution. Cruzan v. Director. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 292 (1990). Since the landmark decision in Cruzan, many states have followed its lead
based on common law and the constitutional right to privacy. See e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855
P.2d 375, 387 (Cal. 1993) (common law); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (constitutional right to privacy); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (Mass. 1980)
(constitutional right to privacy); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987) (grounded in common
law and protected by federal and state constitutional rights of privacy); In re Beth Israel Med. Ctr.,
519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (constitutional right to privacy); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio C.P. 1980) (constitutional fight to privacy); In re Grant,
747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (constitutional right to privacy and a common-law right).
84. Thor, 855 P.2d at 383 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (1972)). Accordingly, a
patient has the right to refuse medical treatment regardless of age or health; the right is static. See In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985).
85. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996).
86. Eau Claire, Medical Case a National First,BELorr DAILY NEWS, Dec. 16, 1996. One other
court has required disclosure of medical experience in the past, but only in certain circumstances.
Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 500 (Ariz. 1978) (holding where patient's seeks elective surgery,
they are "entitled to information concerning the treating physician's experience with the particular
procedure.").
87. See Johnson, 545 N.W. 2d at 506. Plaintiff was scheduled to undergo surgery for a brain
aneurysm. Before doing so, she inquired as to the doctor's experience with her particular surgery,
and his response was that he had done them "dozens" of times, when this was, in fact, not true. See
id. at 505.
88. Id.
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Wisconsin law. 9 In addition to providing the patient with comparative
provider statistics, the court further commented that the physician may also
be required to advise the patient that better treatment is available elsewhere
and that the next logical step would be to provide a referral." Of course the
court in Johnson v. Kokemoor did not address how such statistics are to be

gathered or offer guidance in how they should be used, just that in certain
undefined circumstances, a patient would find them material in his/her

medical decision-making. 9' Countless questions have been left in the wake
of Johnson v. Kokemoor.
Should the physician provide statistics concerning all similar

surgeries he or she has performed, or should the physician restrict
the analysis to his or her experience with patients of similar age,
health or attendant medical complications?

Is the physician

required to obtain a comparable breakdown of data from other
physicians? Should he or she include local physicians, or should the
data include all physicians in the state? In the nation? Further
difficulties are easy to imagine.92
Many see this decision as the "poster child for requiring physicians to
provide comparative statistics."9 While most courts that have entertained
the issue of physician experience have declined to require such disclosure,"
the Kokemoor decision will likely have great effect and often be cited for the
"sweeping statements to the effect that '[t]he duty to provide information
may require ... [p]hysicians... to identify and correlate risk factors and to

communicate the results to patients......

89. Id. at 507 (quoting Wis. STAT. §448.30).
For example, while there may be a general risk of ten percent that a particular surgical
procedure will result in paralysis or death that risk may climb to forty percent when the
particular procedure is performed by a relatively inexperienced surgeon. It defies logic to
interpret this statute as requiring that the first, almost meaningless statistic be divulged to
a patient while the second, far more relevant statistic should not be.
Id.
90. Id.at510.
91. Id.
92. L. Rachel Lerman Helyar & Judith E. Gordon, Informed Consent; Courts Divided Over
Physicians' Duty to Disclose Their "Track Records" to Patients, 17 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
& STRATEGY 3, 2 (Jan. 2000).
93. Email from Daniel L. Icenogle, M.D., J.D. to Jennifer Wolfberg (2000) (on file with the
author); "Other courts don't seem to be jumping on the bandwagon, but Miami lawyer and former
ATLA president Larry Stewart said it is just a matter of time." Hellwege, supra note 2, at 129.
94. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
95. Helyar & Gordon, supra note 92 (citing Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 507 (1996)). An
interesting side note in the Kokemoor case was that the court did not suggest the physician should
have been required to inquire into any non-medical characteristics of the patient. Johnson v.
Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). Incidentally, a Pennsylvania court has recently cited
Johnson v. Kokemoor, positing that the disclosure of comparative provider statistics is material to a
patient's decision-making. Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
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Notwithstanding a physician's truthful response regarding his/her own
experience and expertise, it is the comparative provider statistics that may
cause significant problems despite honest dissemination of the same. It is
this misrepresentation of the statistics that can be both harmful to, or
unjustly enrich the physician, and cause consumers to misuse the data to
their detriment. 6
C. The Purpose of the Doctrine

The purpose of the doctrine of informed consent is to protect the
patient.97 The doctrine of informed consent is a basic social policy that
"gives patients a voice in medical decision making," after hearing risks,
benefits and recommendations from their doctors.9" "[T]echnological
advances in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, spawned by medical
science, provide[] patients and doctors with ever-increasing therapeutic
options, each having its own particular benefits and risks."99 Through the
evolution of informed consent, one principle has remained constant: a
patient's personal autonomy of decision-making."m
Almost thirty years ago, a court vocalized its appreciation of the sanctity
of the patient-doctor relationship by stating, "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body,"' °' and defined meaningful informed consent as the patient's
"opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks
attendant upon each."'"
However, in cases like Arato, °3 with patient

96. Douglas Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific Quality-of-Care Data: A Proposal for Limited
Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 85, 104 (1992).
97. See Gatter, supra note 27, at 561. The doctrine of informed consent "is founded upon a
policy of promoting bodily integrity and self-determination among patients." Id.
98. Katz, supra note 25, at 76. Informed consent requires both the patient and the doctor to make
joint decisions and have open lines of communication where their thoughts and ideas can both be
treated with respect. See id.
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id. at 83. "Respect for individuals as autonomous agents entitles them to such autonomous
determinations without limitation on their liberty being imposed by others." Id. (citations omitted).
See also Arabian, supra note 22, at 68.
101. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)), The facts of Canterbury make it ironically ill-suited to
be a landmark informed consent case as Mr. Canterbury's injuries were more likely caused when he
fell out of bed after the surgery. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48,

72 (1984).
102. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780. In order to grant the consent any legal or moral significance, it
must be knowledgeable in some meaningful sense. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent,
103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994).
103. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).

autonomy in mind, doctors need to wait for a patient's instruction before
disclosing medical information that a patient might otherwise find useful or
material to their decision-making process."° This stance taken by California,
a state that generally is extremely influential in the area of informed consent,
is directly contrary to former concentrations of patient autonomy. 5
As essential as the trust component of the doctor-patient relationship is,
"informed consent was not designed to serve as a medical blueprint for
interactions between physicians and patients."'" Another potential concern
in preserving the trust and good will between the doctor and patient is the
right to privacy. °7 A patient may become offended by discussing matters of
life and death with his/her physician, which may cause a physician to curtail
future discussions.'1 As uncomfortable as a patient may get, it is imperative
the information be conveyed.'" In reference to this concern, Justice Stevens
has wisely quipped, "'[i]t is far better to permit some individuals to make
incorrect decisions than to deny all individuals the right to make decisions
that have a profound effect upon their destiny.""' ' I °
It is well-settled law that the presumption that individuals are competent
and capable of managing their private affairs is correct, "' and thus the
ultimate purpose of informed consent is that information "be disclosed to the
patient who will interpret it and apply it, seeking the advice of others only if
so inclined.""' 2

104. Heinemann, supra note 54 at 1088.
105. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980) (extending the duty to disclose material
information in situations where a patient rejects medical treatment).
106. Katz, supra note 25, at 79; see also supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 85. The idea of having in-depth discussions with a patient to obtain their consent may
offend the patient's right to privacy. Id.
108. Id. at 85-86.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 86 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
111. See e.g., In re MacCrellish's Estate, 141 P. 257, 259 (Cal. 1914); Walton v. Malcolm, 106
N.E. 211,214 (Ill.
1914); Rose v. Rose, 182 S.W.2d 977, 978 (Ky. 1944); White v. White, 196 S.W.
508, 515 (Tex. 1917); see generally 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons and Other Healers § 176
(1981).
112. Arabian, supra note 22, at 269.
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III. THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF LIES: LIES, DAMNED
LIES, AND STATISTICS'

3

"Statisticians study the mathematical relationships among variables.""' 4
However, a causal relationship is not inherent when an association between
variables is found."5 And while we shouldn't "ignore all statistics, or...
assume that every number is false,"" 6 comparative provider statistics "are
not now, nor will they ever be, perfect.""' 7 On their face, statistics should be
approached with a critical eye, evaluating the numbers and distinguishing
between good statistics and bad statistics."'
A. Accurate Statistical Data: The Randomized Clinical Trials v. The
ObservationalDatabase

The decision a patient reaches regarding a course of treatment after a
discussion of relevant provider statistics is seriously jeopardized when the
manner in which the data is obtained is not optimal.' The ideal manner of
comparing alternative therapies is the randomized clinical trial.2

Patients

are divided into two groups, using a blinded random assignment of
treatment, without any considerations of age or other coexisting factors.''
The groups are then given two forms of therapy, or one type of treatment
and one placebo.

2

It then follows that differences in outcome should be

directly attributable to the therapy itself or other confounds such as sampling
3
variability or patient-noncompliance.

113. While Mark Twain's autobiography gives credit to Disraeli, current quotation books suggest
that author is unidentified, or alternatively, additional credit should extend to Henry Labouch~re,
Abram S. Hewitt, and Holloway H. Frost.
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
114. David W. Barnes, Too Many Probabilities:Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 197 (2001).

115. Id.
116. Joel Best, Telling the Truth About Damned Lies and Statistics, The Chronicle Review, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 4, 2001, § 2, at B8 (recognizing that statistics in general
have a bad reputation by citing phrases like "[y]ou can prove anything with statistics" and even a
book, more than 40 years old entitled, How to Lie With Statistics).
117. Sharrott, supra note 96, at 120.
118. Id.
119. Jesse Green, Problems in the Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health Care Providers,
58 BROOK. L. REV. 55,56 (1992).
120. Id. at 57.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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In non-randomized trials, patients are assigned to groups and therapies
based solely on conditions necessitating each form of treatment.'24 This
method weakens the inferences regarding the direct relationship and
statistical outcome of a trial because elements such as duration and severity
of illness are introduced, which skews the results and creates tremendous
bias.'25 In practicality, only non-randomized studies are undertaken because
eliminating a patient's right to choose a physician or treatment2 6 would be
counter-productive to the ultimate goal of benefitting the patient.'
Most or all of the statistics provided to patients are based on
"observational databases" used in an abstract format to compile
comparisons.'27 As such, "[b]iases in published mortality statistics are not
surprising given the inherent limitations of observational databases.""'2 This
flawed data is presented to the patient as the basis of a well-informed
decision, even when "[s]ome of the health care databases... contain many
inaccuracies."' 29 This is critical during litigation when it becomes "important
that courts be fully aware of the limitations of these data."' 3 As evidenced
by Arato v. Avedon, at least one court has already focused its decision on the
questionable nature of these being statistics applicable in individual cases."'
B. Accurate Statistical Data: Accountingfor Patient'sEmotions and
Physician'sUlteriorMotives

Statistical information can sometimes be helpful to a patient in making a
decision when the numerical risk is low but the consequences are so great
that it would be imperative for a patient to be informed.' 2 Accordingly,
courts often believe that reasonable patients would like these statistics made
available to them. 33' However, even if the release of comparative provider
statistics to patients can be purportedly useful, the important issue is whether
they should be believed."' For example, comparative provider statistics may
be used when comparing the effectiveness of care available from each of the

124. Id.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 58-59.
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id. at 65-66. Even before statistical data regarding treatment can be determined, all data
concerning the physician must be accounted for and controlled. See Heinemann, supra note 54, at
1107. Concerns regarding the physician compound the problems that arise when trying to come up
with accurate and reliable statistical data. Id.
130. Green, supra note 119, at 71.
131. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
132. See Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 174 (1995).
133. See id.
134. See Green, supra note 119. Even statistical morbidity rates have been treated as inherently
unreliable, offering little assurance to individual patients. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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providers. 33 However, reliability in determining what therapy yields better
results-that is whether drugs are favored over an invasive procedure-is
difficult to ascertain when one is using an uncontrolled, non-parallel
comparison as available in an observational database.' 6 By the same token,
these comparisons can be even more problematic when trying to determine
whether or not certain outcomes are due to a physician's quality of care
rather than other factors.'37 Patients with the same diagnosis, for instance,
could have different prognoses. 38'
Medical advice given to a patient
regarding their future course of treatment does not consist solely of
comparative patient data. 39 "[The] non-quantifiable 'human elements' will
always be part of the mix."'' ° Ergo, the reasonable patient can be expected
to make a decision based upon the combination of hard data, and a
physician's subjective input, as well as his or her own emotions and state of
mind.'
Accordingly, a physician's own biases may surface regardless of
his/her intent."'
Despite the fact that some statisticians make adjustments accounting for
the severity of the patient's illness, these adjustments alone do not remedy
the fact that providers who treat severely-ill patients still tend to have greater
mortality figures in statistical mortality reports.' 3 In an effort to avoid a
poor evaluation, doctors and hospitals may be inclined to report patients
more severely ill before treatment or more well after treatment or even
refuse care to a patient who may negatively affect their numbers.'44
135. See Green, supra note 119, at 58.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 62. "For example, David P. Byar analyzed thyroid tumor registry data and found that
prognostic factors, such as age, sex, histology of tumor, size and location of tumor and extent of
metastasis, were associated with enormous variation in patients' survival duration." Id.
138. Id. at 63.
139. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers:A FirstLook at the New
Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 8 (1992).
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 8-9. However, it should be noted this is a reasonable patient standard and boilerplate
informed consent forms or discussions are ill-suited for the more sophisticated patient who requires
additional information in order for the physician to obtain "true" informed consent. Scaria v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 227 N.W.2d 647, 653-54 (Wis. 1975).
142. See Katz, supra note 25, at 88. Sometimes a doctor, without being aware of his/her own
biases may end up dispensing only the information they see fit in order to influence a patient's
decision making, not because of self-serving reasons, but alternatively, because the doctor sees
himself/herself in control and more knowledgeable regarding the best interests of the patient. Id.
See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (upholding a decision
that a physician's judgment can be clouded by economic interests).
143. See Green, supra note 119, at 72.
144. Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second Revolution: A Systems/Strategic
Perspective, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 55, 63 (1999). "Risk adjustment is not perfect, and as a result,
hospitals and doctors do not always receive the ratings they should." Id.

IV. IMPACT

Medical statistical data in general may be used for a variety of reasons,
including studies for employee review, rate setting by insurance companies,
and in malpractice litigation, including negligence and informed consent.4 '
For example, Blue Cross and Blue Shield currently adjust hospital
reimbursement rates, and use the rates allotted as punishment.or reward for
the failures and successes of the medical care provided.'46 Notwithstanding

any proffered benefit medical statistics could yield in informed consent, "the
data are not now, nor -will they ever be, perfect."'4 7 However, the use of
comparative provider statistics, even if proven accurate, will not necessarily
assist a plaintiff in making an informed decision.'48 Barraging a patient with
additional information may confuse them, which not only steers away from
the spirit of the doctrine of informed consent, but could damage an already
tenuous relationship between the patient and physician.' 9
A. MaintainingPatientAutonomy With Statistics

"[C]onsent must be informed or knowledgeable in some meaningful
sense if we are to accord it legal or moral significance."'5 Even if a
physician has in their control accurate comparative provider statistics,
having a physician translate the statistics adds chance to misleading or
confusing their patients.'' Allowing the patient to interpret the statistics
offers no solution.'52 A patient who is inundated with statistical data, valid or

not, is not generally equipped with the expertise to determine which
statistics are relevant in making his/her decision, or how to interpret the
statistics once they have decided what is relevant. 3 As a result, a patient
145. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 139, at 7-8.
146. See Green, supra note 119, at 56.
147. Douglas Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific Quality-of-Care Data: A Proposalfor Limited
Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 85, 120 (1992).
148. See generally Green, supra note 119.
149. See id. at 70. Physicians who are against the dissemination of comparative provider statistics
maintain that statistical information may be too complex for the patients to understand and may
"ignore the data or draw erroneous and detrimental conclusions from the data." Sharrott, supra at
note 147, at 93.
150. Schuck, supra note 102, at 900. See also e.g., Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf Ry. v. Jones, 92 S.W.
244, 248 (Ark. 1906); Baer v. Baird Mach. Co., 79 A. 673, 675 (Conn. 1911); Fitzgerald v. Conn.
River Paper Co., 29 N.E. 464, 465 (Mass. 1891); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs
Co., 171 N.E. 391, 392 (N.Y. 1930).
151. Shuck, supra note 102, at 900.
152. See generally Green, supra note 119. Including comparative provider statistics into the
physician-patient discussions of the patient's options may enrich the informed consent process if the
patient had some context in which to evaluate the new information, which in most cases, will not be
likely. See Schuck, supra note 102, at 951.
153. Shuck, supra note 102, at 951. For example, in order to interpret and use to her benefit, the
plaintiff in Kokemoor would have had to understand she needed the statistics on large posterior
circulation aneurysm surgery rather than the statistics on aneurysm surgery generally that she was
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can find they are suffering from "information overload, stress, and illness"
which potentially vitiates any consent received from their treating
physician."' Not being equipped to process the material provided prevents
the patient from granting their informed consent, as confusion from the
deluge of information contradicts the very purpose of the doctrine itself.'55
Some propose it is utility that is the most important element to evaluating
informed consent.' 6 That is, if the information provided by the physician
does not affect, much less improve, the patient's ability to make an informed
decision, it is difficult to justify the requirement of disclosure in the first
place, and such disclosure is useless. 7 Presumably, the decision in
Natanson v. Kline,' which obliged physicians to use "language as simple as
necessary," comes from the belief that it is important for the patient to
understand information disclosed by the physician. 9 It is in the delicate
balance between too much difficult-to-understand information and not
enough digestible information that the patient will be protected. 6 ' With the
current informed consent laws, physicians are permitted to ignore all nonmedical characteristics of patients.'6 ' Not listening to a patient's needs and
avoiding the more personal interaction, the doctor risks violating the
autonomous purpose of the doctrine. ' Accordingly, continuing the policy
of not requiring a doctor to probe a patient for their needs that are driven by
non-medical reasons, and instead requiring the physician to communicate
characteristics of the physician to the patient, further jeopardizes the
integrity of the doctrine.'65
Furthermore, providing a patient with comparative provider statistics
will not necessarily assist a plaintiff in proving a case against a physician.'"
Even the most sophisticated of patients will have a difficult time deciphering

provided. See Johnson v.Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 505 (Wis. 1996). Patients on the whole are
not as medically sophisticated as the physicians from whom they seek treatment, and, as a result,
rather than obtaining consent from the patient, physicians refer to the requirement as "consenting the
patient." Schuck, supra note 102, at 951.
154. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is Right" to "Patient Has
Rights," 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2000) (citing CHARLES W. LIDz ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 323 (Guilford Press 1984)).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
See generally Schuck, supra note 102.
Id.
350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (Kan. 1960).
Kurtz, supra note 153, at 1248.
See generally Gatter, supra note 27.
See supra notes 93-126 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 139, at 32.
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the figures presented to them. A patient who doesn't know the source of the
statistics or the definitions of terms (such as "success rate") will be illprovided with the tools to manage the information.
Is the definition so broad that it encompasses too many false
positives (or so narrow that it excludes too many false negatives)?
How would changing the definition alter the statistic? Similarly,
how do the choices of measurements and samples affect the
statistic? What would happen if different measures or samples were
chosen? And how is the statistic used? Is it being interpreted
appropriately, or has its meaning been mangled to create a mutant
statistic? Are the comparisons that are being made appropriate, or
are apples being confused with oranges? How do different choices
produce the conflicting numbers found in stat wars?'65
Moreover, from a legal standpoint, plaintiffs will still have the burden of
proving that the harm would not have occurred if an alternative provider had
performed the procedure.'66 Instead, patients may have a more difficult time
securing treatment from the physicians they want treatment from, and
physicians may be distracted from their patients and focused instead on their
"batting averages."'67 In fact, the top ranked hospital in 1990 was ranked 24
of 30 just a year earlier. 6 One explanation for this hospital's quick rise to
the top was the decision "not to do as many tougher cases.""'6 This is only
one example of how a patient could be harmed by relying on a particular
provider being superior, when it is inaccurately reported statistics that make
a poor provider look good. 7 '
B. Doctor -PatientRelationship:Bedside Manner and Referrals

Before taking into account the possibility of disclosing comparative
provider statistics, it is important to acknowledge that the doctrine of
informed consent requires only that the physician consider a patient's
condition when talking about treatment options, and not personal or
emotional concerns.'7 ' The motivation to obtain proper informed consent

165. See Best, supra note 116.
166. Id.
167. Green, supra note 119, at 72. See also David Zinman, Hearts in Need MDs: Coronary
Specialists Avoiding High Risk Operations, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1992, available at 1992 WL
7532569. "'Severely ill heart patients are finding it increasingly difficult to get surgery, many
doctors say, because some surgeons and hospitals are refusing to take patients they fear will lower
their standing in state mortality statistics."' Id.
168. Green, supra note 119, at 73.
169. Lawrence K. Altman, Heart-Surgery Death Rates Decline in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1990, at B10.
170. See Sharrott, supra note 96, at 120.
171. See Gatter, supra note 27, at 558. This is the case despite one of the main purposes of
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can deter a physician from getting to know their patients, taking the time to
ask the questions, and finding out what the specific treatment goal is for

each patient. 112
Even if the idealized vision of physician-patient interactions
continues to be that of a longstanding relationship based on personal
intimacy and earned trust, it seems safe to predict that most health
care in the future will be delivered in a highly bureaucratictechnocratic context that discourages such relationships. In this
context, informed consent cannot credibly function as the dialogic
expression of a relationship that no longer exists. Instead, health
care interactions will come to resemble the commercial sales and
other episodic transactions to which less demanding informed
consent requirements apply in other areas of tort law."3
1. Conflicts of Interest
Imposing a duty on physicians to disclose their success rates to their
patients can further compound the flaws that already exist in the doctrine of
informed consent. 4 Patients' emotional input in their decision making play
an influential role in the accuracy of provider statistics, affecting any duty a
physician may have to disclose them.'
Doctors can strategically influence
a patient's decision by selectively presenting data, and anticipating his/her
response. 6 The ramifications of high mortality rates, statistically sound or
not, are that a physician must improve or cease practicing. 7

informed consent being the autonomy in patient decision-making. Id; see also supra notes 77-90
and accompanying text. Because of the minimal requirements imposed on the physician, it is rare
that a patient will ask follow-up questions. See Schuck, supra note 102, at 933.
172. See Gatter, supra note 27, at 558.
173. Schuck, supra note 102, at 926.
174. See id. The idea of creating more of a burden on a physician, that the physician need worry
more about potential liability than assisting their patient, may create a divided loyalty. See id.
Success rates have become more important than ever and the focus on these numbers deters the
physician from becoming familiar with the patient and focusing more on insurance coverage in a
managed health care system. See id.
175. See supra notes 92-124 and accompanying text; see also LoPucki, supra note 144, at 56.
176. See LoPucki, supra note 144. Despite a physicians' attempt to manipulate the outcome of a
patient's decision, it is difficult to determine how the human element of that patient would come into
play. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 139, at 10. See also notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
However, commentators continue to speculate that providers will combat adverse rankings by
"cooking the statistics." Id.
177. See LoPucki, supra note 144, at 63.
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Physicians already carry a burden of information disclosure in the states
that use the reasonable patient standard.'78 "[T]he failure of providers to
develop and communicate relevant statistical information to patients may
take on greater significance" adding to this burden.'79 Placing the onus of
determining relevant statistical information, as well as its compilation and
communication, on the shoulders of the physician furthers the burden on the
physician and limits the regulatory power of any outside source to contribute
to the accuracy of the data and statistical analysis. 8 Doctors may find
themselves likely to treat their patients' feelings and specific medical needs
as secondary to the dissemination of statistical information.'8 ' The very
prospect undermines the purpose of informed consent,'82 which is not only to
empower the patient with knowledge, but to give the physician the
responsibility of putting his/her interests below the best interest of his/her
patient.' 3 While those who support this additional duty placed on healthcare providers admit that there is no bright-line test regarding what statistical
data should be delivered to the patient, they do not offer any guidelines or
assistance to physicians in choosing what data to communicate."84
Furthermore, flawed statistics present the potential for a physician to
falsely slander a "truly good provider's reputation by incorrectly associating
his or her identity with information indicative of bad care."'8
2.

Referring Away the Treatable Patient

A duty to refer to other doctors because they may be better is absurd the common law has long recognized a duty to refer patients to specialists,
but this is typically limited to general practitioners.'86 If a duty to refer
patients to the optimal provider is imposed on a doctor, the likelihood is that
the doctor will consistently refer the same type of patients to the same
doctor, and at some point the doctor who has received the referrals may have
178. See supra note 46.
179. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 139, at 9.
180. See generally id.
181. See id. This is problematic, in light of courts' determination that a "patient's need
determines the scope of the.., communications." Heinemann, supra note 54, at 1084.
182. The principal goals of informed consent, promoting and protecting patient autonomy, cannot
be achieved without dissemination of reliable information which is communicated in an intelligible
and meaningful way. See Schuck, supra note 102, at 948.
183. Id. at 921.
184. See LoPucki, supra note 144, at 65. The additional burden placed on physicians is yet to be
clearly defined: "Providers would have to decide what information provides a reasonable basis for
decisionmaking, disclose it to their patients, and then, if necessary, defend their choices of
information in actions brought by their patients. Providers would not, however, be required to make
disclosures that their patients did not want." Id.
185. Sharrott, supra note 146 at 120.
186. Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 167 (1995). This reasoning has been in other
jurisdictions as well. See e.g., Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 568, 571 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984).
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to defer patients because of his/her schedule. 87 The patient having this
knowledge can strain the relationship between the doctor and patient.'88 For
instance, the patient who is referred to another practitioner and then referred
again because of scheduling conflicts now is aware that he/she is not
receiving the "best" care. Despite the fact that this physician might have
been chosen initially, without the benefit of comparative provider statistics,
the patient may not be happy with his/her treatment, and therefore subject to
unnecessary stress and concern, for no other reason than having acquired
knowledge.' 9 If the patient has the ability to seek treatment from the
physician to whom he/she was referred, the physician doing the referring
may be left with little or no business.' ° Newly starting-out physicians may
be severely hampered in gaining experience and those with physician
records that appear blemished, may be destroyed. ''
An improvement in the relationship between the doctor and patient is
what will lead to improved health and an increase in patient satisfaction and
loyalty.'92 In order to obtain more of a symbiotic relationship, doctors should
be required to pay closer attention to the treatment goals of their patients,'93
rather than disseminate confusing, and inaccurate statistical data.'94
V.

CONCLUSION

While the availability of medical information continues to flourish, the
imposition on a physician to disclose comparative-provider statistics to their
patients will likely have a negative effect on the doctrine of informed
consent.'95 This comment urges those eager to revolutionize informed
consent to revisit the purpose of the doctrine itself.'96 Requiring doctors to
disclose comparative statistical information can only result in strategically
doctored statistics, confusion on the part of patients interpreting data, and a
"If patients are
general decay in the doctor-patient relationship.'97

187. See generally LoPucki, supra note 144.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 71.
190. Id. at 56.
191. See generally id.
192. Id.
193. See id. In addition to diagnosing a patient, taking the time to get to know the patient's goals
will also contribute to that patient truly making an autonomous decision. See id. An improved
communication will assist the patient in their decision-making. Id.
194. See id.
195. See discussion supra Part IV.
196. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
197. See discussion supra Part IV.B.

autonomous and capable of making decisions concerning their health care,
and if that right is important to us as individuals and as a society, we must
act in a way that encourages and enables patients to exercise that
responsibility.""'9 And, if patient autonomy is truly the purpose and goal of
informed consent, rather than to inundate a patient with potentially
confusing and inaccurate information, a doctor should concentrate on
listening to the wants and needs of his/her patient, those both medically and
non-medically related.'99
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199. See discussion supra Parts II.B.3., IV.
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